Wrong-Site Procedures: Preventable Never Events that Continue to Happen by Lin, Andrew et al.
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors




the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books






Wrong-Site Procedures: Preventable Never Events that
Continue to Happen
Andrew Lin, Brian Wernick, Julia C. Tolentino and
Stanislaw P. Stawicki
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.69242
© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
Andrew Lin, Brian Wernick, Julia C. Tolentino 
and Stanislaw P. Stawicki
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
Abstract
A comprehensive discussion of “never events” or preventable and grievously shocking 
medical errors that may result in serious morbidity and mortality is incomplete with‐
out a thorough analysis of wrong‐site procedures (WSP). These occurrences are often 
due to multiple, simultaneous failures in team processes and communication. Despite 
being relatively rare, wrong‐site surgery can be devastating to all parties involved, from 
patients and families to healthcare workers and hospitals. This chapter provides a gen‐
eral overview of the topic in the context of clinical vignettes discussing specific examples 
of WSP. The goal of this work is to educate the reader about risk factors and preventive 
strategies pertinent to WSP, with the hope of propagating the knowledge required to 
eliminate these “never events.” To that end, the chapter discusses pitfalls in current sur‐
gical practice that may contribute to critical safety breakdowns and emphasizes the need 
for multiple overlapping measures designed to improve patient safety. Furthermore, 
updated definitions regarding WSP are included in order to better characterize the dif‐
ferent types of WSP. Most importantly, this chapter presents evidence‐based support 
for the current strategies to prevent wrong‐site events. A summary of selected recent 
wrong‐site occurrences is also provided as a reference for researchers in this important 
area of patient safety.
Keywords: never events, patient safety, patient safety errors, safety protocols,  
wrong‐site surgery
1. Introduction
The rare but dramatic adverse occurrences as inexcusable and difficult to comprehend as 
wrong‐site procedures (WSP) continue to shed negative light on our medical systems and 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapt r is distributed under the terms of the Creative Comm s
Attribution L cense (http://creativecommons. /licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
bring into the light the fallibility of today’s advanced healthcare environment [1, 2]. Dramatic 
news about the incorrect extremity amputation, spinal fixation above or below the intended 
level, or wrong rib being removed, intermittently appear on the landscape of headline news 
and “hard to believe” factoids. Personal, social, healthcare, and medico‐legal burdens of WSP 
are significant, especially when one considers that these never events should never have 
happened in the first place [2, 3]. Indeed, well‐functioning operating and procedural teams 
should be able to prevent these occurrences [4], especially when patients are actively partici‐
pating in surgical site verification [5].
Malpractice database data suggest that approximately 1 in 113,000 surgical procedures are 
complicated by some sort of intervention at a “wrong site” [6]. For a typical hospital, it means 
Figure 1. Relative frequency of wrong‐site procedures (WSP) listed by specialty. Note that specialties with high 
percentage of laterality‐specific cases (e.g., orthopedics, neurosurgery) report much higher percentage of WSP (data 
from 2007 to 2011). Data compiled from multiple sources.
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that WSP occur once every 5–10 years [7]. Wrong‐site procedures constitute the second most 
frequent type of sentinel event reported, accounting for nearly 13% of all occurrences [8]. 
Literature regarding the frequency of WSP varies widely, depending on the reporting spe‐
cialty and procedure type(s) involved. It is recognized that specialties performing frequent 
procedures involving various extremity [9], symmetric truncal/cranial/facial locations [2], or 
level‐based surgeries [10] will inherently be more prone to WSP events (Figure 1) [6, 11–13]. 
For example, one study reported that 16% of hand surgeons reported prepping to operate on 
the wrong site but then noticing the error prior to incision, and >20% of respondents admit‐
ting to WSP at least once during their career [9]. Fortunately, major injury attributable to WSP 
is very rare [6].
Notable initiatives implemented to reduce WSP include the surgical safety checklist [14], 
the “sign, mark, and radiograph” initiative [15], various measures to empower the patient 
to participate in the perioperative safety process [5], as well as the Joint Commission’s 
“Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery” 
[16]. It has been postulated that current site verification procedures aimed at reducing the 
incidence of WSP are questionably effective and not supported by scientific evidence [6]. To 
corroborate the effectiveness of the above measures, it has been shown that interventions 
such as operating room (OR) briefings have been shown to produce benefits in terms of the 
perceived risk of WSP [1], and that the surgical safety checklist is not only productive but 
also non‐disruptive—an accusation frequently heard during initial implementation phases 
of various patient safety initiatives [17]. As previously mentioned, it is undisputable that 
insufficient communication is among the most commonly identified root causes of patient 
safety events [18–20], with various verification and safety procedures being only “as good 
as” the implementation team.
2. Definitions
It is important to utilize uniform language conventions and definitions when discussing WSP. 
DeVine et al. [8], defined the conceptual framework for WSP that will be utilized in this chap‐
ter (Table 1). Additional important definitions have been defined in the introductory chapter 
of this book, and the reader is referred to that resource for further information and guidance. 
Although this language was originally developed to reflect WSP that occur in spinal surgeries, 
it is certainly applicable to other types of invasive procedures and specialties. Additionally, 
the definition of the wrong implant is added to make these terms truly inclusive of all types of 
procedural settings. Figure 2 shows the distribution of WSP events broken down according to 
the definitions provided in Table 1, with data derived from Neily et al. [11, 12].
2.1. Clinical Vignette #1
According to a published report [21], a 15‐year‐old boy with seizure disorder was scheduled 
for surgery to remove epileptic foci on the right side of his brain. The patient was prepped and 
draped, but the surgical site was not marked, and no “surgical time‐out” was documented. 
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After removal of brain tissue, the surgical team realized that they were operating on the left 
side of patient’s brain. They elected to continue with the intended procedure and went on to 
remove brain tissue from the right side of the patient’s brain.
The neurosurgeon subsequently informed the patient’s parents that he initially operated on 
the wrong side of the patient’s brain, but switched to the correct side and completed the origi‐
nally intended procedure. He reassured the parents that no brain tissue had been removed 
Figure 2. Bar graph showing WSP event frequency grouped by error type. The most common occurrences involve either 
wrong patient or wrong side.
Term Definition
Wrong‐site procedure Invasive procedures performed on the incorrect body part or incorrect patient. This is a 
“catch all” term for wrong level/part, wrong patient, and wrong side surgery
Wrong level/part Invasive procedure performed at the correct site but at the wrong level or part of the 
operative field
Wrong procedure Invasive procedure that unjustifiably differed from the originally planned procedure, 
performed at the correct site
Wrong patient Incorrect patient identification leading to a procedure performed on the wrong patient
Wrong side Invasive procedure that involves operating on the wrong side of the body
Wrong level exposure Surgical exposure performed on an unintended level, however, does not imply that 
surgery was performed at the incorrect level
Wrong implant/prosthesis/
device
Placement of an implant, prosthesis, or device other than what was intentionally 
planned for the specific surgical procedure. This does not include intentionally placed 
implants, prostheses, or devices that are later found to perform optimally or fail
Modified from DeVine et al. [8].
Table 1. The conceptual and definitional framework for wrong‐site procedural occurrences.
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from the wrong side and that overall “no harm was done.” It was only after approximately 17 
months that the parents discovered via magnetic resonance imaging that their child was miss‐
ing portions of his left amygdala, hippocampus, and had a detectable injury to other regions 
of left cerebral hemisphere. The parents also claimed that their child had suffered cognitive 
problems, personality changes, and developed episodes of “blank and void look in his eyes.”
Given the newly revealed information, the parents initiated a legal complaint against the sur‐
geon, the hospital, and their insurance carrier citing medical malpractice. It was also alleged 
that the hospital administration failed to stop the surgery to the right side of the brain once 
the surgical team realized they have operated on the incorrect side. A $20 million award to 
the parents of the patient was upheld by the state supreme court after a jury verdict in their 
favor [21].
2.2. Clinical Vignette #2
A 53‐year‐old patient presented to the hospital with abdominal pain and hematuria. 
Diagnostic workup included a computed tomography (CT) scan which revealed a mass in 
the right kidney consistent with renal cell carcinoma (RCC). Despite this finding, all of the 
hospital medical records erroneously documented a left‐sided tumor. The patient was subse‐
quently transferred to another hospital for definitive surgical management. The CT scan from 
the initial hospital was not available, and the patient did not undergo repeat imaging at the 
receiving center prior to surgery.
Despite the lack of imaging, the surgeon decided to proceed with the surgery and removed 
the patient’s left kidney based on the available medical record information. The left kidney 
was sent to the pathologist who detected no evidence of RCC. It was only after the patholo‐
gist called the surgeon the following day and after the surgeon reviewed the imaging that he 
realized that the incorrect kidney was removed.
The patient was then scheduled for a second surgery to remove the right kidney harboring 
the RCC. As a consequence, the patient was rendered dialysis‐dependent having lost both 
kidneys, and due to his cancer, he is not eligible for renal transplant. No information regard‐
ing legal consequences was available for this case [22], but certainly, the risk of liability is 
extremely high.
3. Discussion
The two clinical vignettes presented above are both tragic cases of preventable wrong‐site 
surgery occurrences. In addition to causing major harm to the patients involved, these events 
resulted in significant emotional distress to the patients’ relatives as well as major medico‐
legal, professional, and reputational consequences to the healthcare providers and institutions 
involved. In the first case, where the tissue was removed from the wrong side of the patient’s 
brain, a series of cumulative errors were made even before the surgery began. Available details 
from the subsequent legal proceedings indicated that during the day of the surgery, local 
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reporters were invited to take photographs and observe the surgery. This may have created 
an unacceptable level of distraction [23, 24]. Additionally, standard pre‐procedural safety 
measures were not utilized, such as a pre‐operative checklist and marking of the operative 
site. It has been shown that the presence of formalized OR briefing prior to making the inci‐
sion increases the operative team’s level of awareness (and thus confidence) regarding critical 
details of the procedure to be performed [1].
The occurrence of “never events” prompts clinicians, administrators, and patients to wonder 
why these errors continue to happen. Figure 3 compiles data regarding contributing factors 
and causes of WSP from three studies reported between 2007 and 2010 [11, 13, 25]. Inadequate 
communication is the most frequent contributory cause of wrong‐site surgery. In over 20% 
of cases reviewed during root cause analysis sessions, communication error was a major con‐
tributing factor in the wrong site, wrong procedure and wrong patient surgery [26]. Potential 
reasons for disorderly or deficient communication in Case Vignette #1 include the presence 
of reporters in the OR and the associated atmosphere of distraction. The presence of distrac‐
tions and “unexpected” factors during the operation, in turn, has been shown to increase the 
risk of safety errors [27–29]. The latter may be due to lack of team or individual focus, and the 
subsequently diminished ability to “intercept and detect” errors [30–32].
The tragic cascade of errors in Clinical Vignette #1 was further compounded by the omission 
of the pre‐operative checklist, surgical “time‐out,” and surgical site marking. This highlights 
the importance of the existing patient safety framework, mandated by the Joint Commission 
for continued institutional accreditation, and consisting of three specific measures to be con‐
ducted prior to all operations [16, 33]. Despite that, some have questioned the effectiveness of 
the measures required by the Joint Commission. For example, DeVine et al. noted the lack of 
data on the efficacy of pre‐operative checklists and suggested the addition of intra‐operative 
imaging, specifically for spine surgery, to verify the correct site [8]. However, a multicenter 
prospective study of the main components of the Joint Commission’s recommendations did 
demonstrate the effectiveness of these simple and easy to implement measures [34].
Figure 3. Most common causes of wrong‐site procedure (WSP) events. By far, communication and “time‐out” related 
issues predominate among all causes.
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Surgical “time‐outs” have been validated and studied thoroughly. One study showed that 
an extended pre‐induction surgical “time‐out” improved communication within the OR [35]. 
Marking of the surgical site is particularly important. Clarke et al. noted that the surgeon’s 
actions in the OR are a major contributing factor to the occurrence WSP [36]. Others have 
emphasized that structured protocols combining various safety measures, and not their indi‐
vidual subcomponents, are the key to reducing wrong‐site events [37] and improving patient 
safety in general [20, 31].
Appropriate measures, including redundant safety systems, to prevent catastrophic outcomes 
have been implemented in other high‐risk areas including aviation, maritime, and nuclear 
industries [38]. Modern industrial safety systems emerged with the broader understanding 
that it is not any individual components or cross‐check that by itself reduces the risk of failure, 
but rather a strategically designed combination thereof [19, 20]. This philosophy aligns itself 
with the idea that medical errors resulting in adverse outcomes usually stem from a series of 
individual and systemic failures, all “aligning” within the framework of the so‐called Swiss 
Cheese model [19, 39]. Research on adverse events in the OR suggests that the “Swiss Cheese” 
theoretical framework can serve as a good foundation for improving not only safety and qual‐
ity of care but also as an agent for lasting, sustainable institutional culture change [40].
Different “failure modes” exist in regard to WSP. For example, one report describes a sce‐
nario where a surgeon marked the correct operative site with a marker, but in the period 
between the original surgeon marking being made and the subsequent initiation of a surgical 
“time‐out,” the patient created an imprint of the mark on the other leg [41]. This occurrence 
highlighted the possibility of a new “failure mode” in a system designed to prevent WSP, 
and despite everyone’s best intentions, the end result was two marked sites, one on each leg 
[41]. In addition, surgical “time‐out” is an effective tool but may fail if it is not appropriately 
instituted, properly followed, or not taken seriously by the team [42]. Particularly in the office 
setting, where standardized protocols may not be universally implemented, WSP are a risk 
during invasive outpatient procedures, such as excision of a suspicious skin lesion. Under 
such circumstances, it has been proposed that WSP risk may be reduced by photographing 
and marking the surgical site, introducing “universal protocol,” and examining any speci‐
mens of questionable quality before concluding the procedure [43].
Pre‐operative verification is another critical component in the overall WSP equation. Again, 
failure may arise if the verification procedure is performed improperly if there is confusion, 
or when communication is deficient. Based on >400 reports of WSP, as many as 25% involved 
scheduling errors as a contributing factor. In addition, the authors stated that “…surgeons 
verifying procedure with the patient in pre‐op holding had the greatest net contribution to 
the prevention of wrong‐site errors” [36]. It has been suggested that the balance between the 
relative importance of various checklist items and the perception of risk associated with each 
respective element also plays a role in implementation and overall compliance with various 
patient safety verification procedures [44].
Various safety procedure compliance issues have been researched over time, both individu‐
ally and at the health system level. In this domain, the implementation of simple but redun‐
dant checks to prevent occurrences of patient safety events has been proposed as an effective 
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 methodology [4]. However, non‐compliance despite simplification of these safety checks con‐
tinues to frustrate the attainment of “zero defect” safety goal [45]. Patient safety advocates con‐
tinue to argue for more personal accountability at the level of key surgical team members [42]. 
In addition, it has been shown that non‐compliance may be strongly related to the overarching 
themes in patient safety events—poor communication and ineffective team collaboration [44].
In the Clinical Vignette #1, non‐compliance with established safety protocols was the root 
cause of the failure. However, the situation was made worse by the way the error disclosure 
was made and further compounded by the family finding out the true magnitude of the sur‐
gical mistake at a much later time. This brings us to the final issue in this particular patient 
scenario—professionalism and communication involving patients and their loved ones. It has 
long been established that honesty and apologetic stance both decrease, rather than increase, 
the likelihood of subsequent blame and anger [46–49]. Humble and honest acknowledg‐
ment, along with an authentic apology, can also improve the relationship and increase trust 
between the involved physician and patient or their family [46, 48, 50, 51]. By the time, it was 
discovered that significant damage occurred as a result of WSP, it was too late for any form 
of reconciliation outside of the legal system. Such confluence of factors is not unique to this 
particular case and has occurred in a number of high‐profile occurrences including disclo‐
sure‐related issues [52–54].
Clinical Vignette #1 demonstrates critical safety errors at multiple points in time and on multi‐
ple levels during the patient care. Beginning with distracting events prior to surgery and criti‐
cal communication failures perioperatively, the subsequent series of mishaps involved the 
lack of adherence to mandatory safety protocols (e.g., the pre‐operative checklist, a “time‐out” 
before the surgery, and marking of the surgical site) followed by lax professionalism stan‐
dards and incomplete disclosure of the magnitude of the error to the patient’s family. In con‐
clusion, this “never event” could have been prevented and any harm avoided or minimized 
had the OR team adhered to protocols and follow simple, standardized safety procedures.
The second case, outlined in Clinical Vignette #2, involves breakdowns at the systemic level as 
well as critical judgment errors that highlight the importance of the adherence to established 
Joint Commission safety measures [55]. Having said that it must be noted that the involved 
surgeon’s actions and poor judgment may have been difficult to intercept without a more 
robust system of cross‐checks at the institution where the procedure occurred. Although the 
error occurred at the referring hospital, the “Swiss Cheese” model discussed earlier in the 
chapter suggests that another omission at the receiving hospital likely “allowed” the error 
to continue undetected [19]. Communication errors, once again, played an important role 
here, with critical contributions to the mishap originating with the co‐occurrence of incorrect 
medical documentation and the lack of source imaging data that could be used to “verify or 
rectify” the laterality of the involved kidney. In terms of human factors, the surgeon exercised 
extremely poor judgment by proceeding to the operating room without imaging [22].
A series of system errors were described in Clinical Vignette #2. As a consequence, the patient 
underwent unnecessary surgical procedures, experienced a complete loss of renal function, 
and was faced with the prospect of being dialysis dependent due to the underlying malignancy 
precluding him as a kidney transplant recipient. Much like in the first vignette, communication 
failures again arise as major contributors to WSP occurrence. Critical communication errors 
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have been reported both in the setting of intra‐ and inter‐hospital transfers, especially in the 
context of the ever‐evolving information systems infrastructure [56–59]. In Clinical Vignette 
#2, an unacceptable communication breakdown between two hospital facilities was further 
compounded by either the lack of appropriate verification policies or disregard for existing 
patient safety procedures. Failure to correctly document the kidney affected by malignancy, 
combined with the lack of confirmatory imaging greatly increased the risk of error. However, it 
was ultimately the judgment of the surgical team at the second hospital to forego preoperative 
and intra‐operative imaging. In theory, any OR team member should have been empowered to 
stop an unsafe process (e.g., much like a flight attendant who is empowered to abort an airline 
flight departure) [19, 60–62]; however, this apparently did not occur in Clinical Vignette #2.
In a perfect scenario, the patient should not have been transferred without all necessary docu‐
mentation, including the presence of all pertinent radiography data and results. Upon arrival 
at the receiving hospital, patient safety and verification procedures should have ensured that 
all required elements for the safe conduct of a surgical procedure with pre‐specified lateral‐
ity are satisfied. At the minimum, the lack of source imaging should be included as a “hard 
stop” during the conduct of pre‐operative checklist and then during the surgical “time‐out” 
[63, 64]. This applies to a variety of potential clinical scenarios, from the one outlined in Clinical 
Vignette #2 to extremity procedures performed on multiply injured orthopedic patient, to tho‐
racostomy tube, or orthopedic traction pin placement [65, 66]. Invasive interventions classified 
as “wrong site,” “wrong patient,” or “wrong procedure” are all considered to be “never events” 
and require mandatory reporting and root cause analysis [19, 67].
As defined earlier in this book, the term “never event” includes a heterogeneous group of 
complications that involve unacceptable outcomes are considered preventable and have 
been deemed intolerable by both the public and the professional standards of the medical 
community [19, 68]. Just as airline customers should not be concerned about landing in a 
wrong city or airport, patients should never have to consider or be concerned about the 
potential risk of their procedure being potentially complicated by wrong site, incorrect 
patient identity, or wrong operation. As outlined throughout this text, any potential or 
actual harm to the patient carries the burden of legal liability and regulatory reporting [69]. 
Because of the cumulative costs associated with medical and surgical errors, government 
agencies and the medical community continue to devote significant resources to prevent 
“never events.” Targeted interventions, such as the “surgical safety checklist,” help reduce 
adverse occurrences applicable to specific circumstances [70], whereas more general inter‐
ventions help optimize provider performance by reducing factors that lead to undue stress, 
inefficient team communication, distractions, or fatigue [20, 71, 72].
It is well established that medical errors are associated with more deaths per year than 
Alzheimer’s disease and illicit drug use combined [73, 74]. In an effort to enhance patient safety 
in the United States, policies have been implemented to reduce and/or prevent a broad range 
of “never events,” including wrong site, wrong patient, or wrong procedure occurrences. In 
2004, uniform safety checks were put in place by the Joint Commission of Hospital Providers 
(JCAHO), now known and well recognized as the “universal protocol” (UP) [16, 33]. To help 
enforce this initiative at the institutional level, failure to adhere to UP jeopardizes the hospi‐
tal’s accreditation with the organization. The UP consists of three mandatory components:
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1. A preoperative verification of the patient, and the procedure to be conducted.
2. Any site to be operated on must be physically marked.
3. A “time‐out” must be carried out immediately before any surgical procedure.
Despite the implementation of the universal protocol, cases of wrong‐site surgery still sur‐
face at alarming rates (Table 2). Kwaan et al. [6] reported an incidence rate of 1 in 112,994 for 
WSP cases between 1985 and 2004, which includes all inpatient OR occurrences. However, 
an editorial that followed suggested that WSP rate may be as high as 1 in 5000 cases due to 
the under‐reporting of these events [75]. Despite multiple calls to action and corresponding 
patient safety initiatives, medical errors are still considered among the leading causes of death 
in the United States on annual basis [76].
Location (year) 
[reference]
Details of occurrence(s) Comment
Massachusetts, USA 
(1992) [77]
A 22‐year‐old man underwent surgery 
intended to treat his L4‐5 disc herniation 
demonstrated on MRI. The patient 
underwent surgery, but his symptoms 
continued. Approximately 2 years later, he 
underwent another MRI, which showed 
that the original operation was carried out 
at the L3‐4 level
The surgeon attempted to explain the error 
by suggesting that the original plan involved 
determining the level of intervention at the 
time of surgery. However, no mentions of 
such plan were ever made in the medical 
record or (according to the patient) 
communicated in such fashion. The case was 
settled for $150,000
Florida, USA  
(1995) [78]
Incorrect leg was amputated following 
a series of communication and 
documentation errors
The physician involved was subject to 
disciplinary action and loss of license. 
Numerous potential systemic safety issues 
may have been involved
Rhode Island, USA 
(2009) [79]
Five separate wrong‐site operations were 
carried out at a facility. Different anatomic 
locations were involved, including head/
neck, mouth, hand/finger, and the brain
Substantial fines were imposed by the 
Rhode Island State Department of Health. In 
addition, multiple additional safety checks 
were mandated, including the presence of OR 
video cameras for monitoring and oversight 
purposes. The involvement of multiple 
anatomic locations, and presumably different 
surgical teams, strongly suggests a systemic 
etiology of errors
Romford, UK  
(2011) [80]
A 5‐month pregnant patient underwent 
surgery for acute appendicitis. During the 
procedure, her right ovary was removed 
in error. The patient was then readmitted 
with continued abdominal pain, suffered 
a miscarriage, required evacuation of 
appendiceal abscess, and subsequently 
died during repeat surgery to remove her 
appendix
Multiple errors, at multiple organizational 
levels, were made. The initial pathology 
result demonstrated that an ovary was 
removed instead of the appendix. Yet, this 
information was not read by relevant hospital 
staff. Based on available data, there were 
several opportunities to rectify the error, all of 
which were missed. Medical tribunal review 
followed
Basildon, UK  
(2012) [81]
Female patient required a superior segment 
of her lung removed. Instead, surgeons 
removed a basilar segment
Error was attributed to incorrect information 
in medical record. Similar to Clinical Vignette 
#2, the case involved inter‐hospital transfer 
and a number of systemic factors
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4. Preventive strategies
Numerous preventive strategies to reduce rates of WSP have been proposed. It has been rec‐
ommended that the UP be expanded to non‐surgical specialties and that “zero‐tolerance” 
philosophy be implemented in the setting of recurrent events [13]. In addition to vigilant 
adherence to the UP [86], calls have been made to foster open dialogue regarding WSP and 
other “never events,” including frank discussions of each individual occurrence [87]. Others 
suggest the use of simulation training to achieve universal staff compliance with safety proce‐
dures [88, 89]. The addition of a formal pre‐operative briefing as an additional “checkpoint” 
may also play a role [11]. Emphasis on professional behavior during periods of critical transi‐
tions (e.g., patient transfers, surgical “time out,” and surgical site marking) is an  important 
Location (year) 
[reference]
Details of occurrence(s) Comment
Florida, USA  
(2013) [82]
Surgical incision was made into a patient’s 
RLE instead of the LLE. The error was 
discovered intra‐operatively and LLE 
surgery was completed
During disclosure, the error was allegedly 
presented as “justified mistake”. Subsequent 
review of the facility found multiple patient 
safety and regulatory issues
Baku, Azerbaijan 
(2016) [83]
A 87‐year‐old woman was supposed to 
undergo LLE amputation for complications 
of diabetes. Instead, the RLE was 
amputated
Following the error, the surgeon avoided the 
family, later providing irrational explanations 
for the mistake Governmental committee was 
created to examine this event and improve 
patient safety in the country
Connecticut, USA 
(2016) [52]
Patient was undergoing surgery for 8th rib 
resection. Instead, part of the 7th rib was 
removed. Patient then required another 
operation shortly after
The patient alleged that the communication 
regarding the event was inadequate. Legal 
action followed as a result. It is likely that 
several different factors played a role in the 
event
New Delhi, India 
(2016) [84]
A 24‐year‐old man required surgery for 
RLE injuries. Surgeons erroneously inserted 
two rods into LLE
After filing unsuccessful complaints with the 
hospital, the family filed a lawsuit
Hanoi, Vietnam  
(2016) [85]
Surgical team mistakenly operated on a 
patient’s RLE instead of the LLE
Errors at the team level were identified. The 
surgeon and the involved surgical team were 
suspended. The hospital agreed to cover all 
charges related to care
Massachusetts, USA 
(2016) [7]
It is alleged that a kidney was removed 
from the wrong patient
Communication and system errors at multiple 
points in the preoperative and operative 
process were involved, leading to patient 
misidentification and then propagation of the 
incorrect information
Reports are based on various publically available sources and only publically available information is included. Note the 
global nature of the problem, with events of similar type taking place around the world.
L3–4/L4–5, lumbar 3rd/4th/5th levels; LLL, left lower extremity; MRI, magnetic resonance imaging; OR, operating room; 
RLE, right lower extremity.
Table 2. Selected wrong site, wrong side, and wrong patient surgery occurrences.
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factor in preventing communication‐related failures [90]. Team‐based approaches that 
encourage both individual engagements and foster collective responsibility are critical to the 
safe operations of the modern OR [20, 26, 55].
5. Conclusions
WSP are a high‐impact, low‐frequency “never event” that occurs throughout all procedural 
specialties. Consequences of WSP are profound, beginning with the psychological and physi‐
cal harm to the patient. In addition, the affected patient’s loved ones are also highly likely 
to suffer emotional consequences of having been indirectly exposed to a wrong‐site event. 
Finally, all individuals involved on the healthcare team are deeply affected by the event 
itself as well as by its aftermath [19]. Finally, WSP occurrences significantly damage the trust 
between the public and the healthcare system, creating a negative atmosphere that requires 
tremendous efforts and long periods of time to overcome. From the medico‐legal perspective, 
there is little in the way of legal defense from an event as obvious as WSP. Consequently, 
physicians leave themselves and their institutions open to malpractice suits when such events 
occur.
Due to the damaging effects of WSP on all stakeholders involved, significant resources have 
been dedicated to the elimination of WSP, with the goal of “zero incidence.” Measures imple‐
mented to achieve this goal include the UP, which involves a preoperative checklist and 
“time‐out” prior to the start of any invasive procedure. Surgical site marking procedures are 
also of critical importance and should proactively involve the patient whenever feasible. In 
the end, every WSP event ultimately involves human teams. Among all the safeguards imple‐
mented and studied, the ultimate responsibility will always rest in the hands of the surgical 
team performing the procedure. No “checklist” or another safeguard can ever perfectly sub‐
stitute for the astute and observant provider with the mindset of doing their best, ensuring 
safety, listening carefully, questioning and speaking up when needed, and conducting the 
operation according to the highest professional standards.
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